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Satisfaction in the Law
David G. Campbell
Tonight I would like to discuss two disturbing developments in the
legal profession—developments I believe to be related. They have been
much discussed during recent years, but few people seem to see any connec-
tion between them.
The ﬁrst development is the ever-increasing emphasis on the commer -
cial and economic side of law practice and a corresponding decrease in
lawyer public service. One need only pick up a copy of any modern legal
magazine to see the commercial emphasis. It is trumpeted in articles and
surveys that measure professional success almost exclusively in terms of
income and status.
The decrease in public service is more diﬃcult to detect, but nonetheless
real. It was highlighted in February when the ABA House of Delegates
found it necessary to pass an amendment to the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility. The amendment states that lawyers should render at
least  hours of pro bono legal services each year.1 Forty hours should be
spent providing legal services to the poor, with another ten devoted to
improving the law, the legal system, or the legal profession. The remarkable
aspect of this amendment is not that it occurred, but that it was deemed
necessary by the leaders of our profession. Delegates from around the
nation concluded that modern lawyers need an ethical imperative if they
are to spend the equivalent of one hour per week providing legal assistance
to the poor. Equally concerning is the fact that signiﬁcant lawyers and
groups of lawyers opposed the new rule. They apparently thought it
improper or ill-advised to require lawyers to provide pro bono services to
the poor.
The second development—one that probably should not be mentioned
during an awards ceremony for third-year law students—is the widely
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documented dissatisfaction modern lawyers feel with their profession. A
 survey by the National Law Journal, for example, found that only  per-
cent of all lawyers were “very satisﬁed” with their professional lives.2 Nearly
two-thirds complained that law has become less of a profession and more
of a business. More than half view other lawyers as obnoxious. Seventy
percent dislike the long hours and tension of practicing law.
I believe there is a relationship between the increasing unhappiness of
lawyers on one hand and our profession’s modern emphasis on economics,
with its corresponding de-emphasis on public service, on the other hand.
I see this connection largely because of several experiences our ﬁrm has had
in pro bono practice and the eﬀect those experiences have had on my own
happiness as a lawyer.
Twelve years ago our ﬁrm agreed to undertake the pro bono representa-
tion of John Henry Knapp, a well-known inmate on Arizona’s death row.
Knapp had been convicted seven years earlier of deliberately setting a ﬁre
that had killed his two daughters in the bedroom of their home. As you can
imagine, a crime so repulsive had received widespread publicity in Arizona.
By the time our ﬁrm was approached about the case, Knapp had exhausted
his appeals and lost several petitions for post-conviction relief. Several
times the Arizona Supreme Court had issued warrants for his execution,
only to have them stayed by yet another judicial challenge. Worst of all,
Knapp had confessed to committing the crime, making his plight all the less
sympathetic.
Knapp had been charged and convicted largely because of a state
arson investigator’s conclusion that the Knapp ﬁre was not accidental—
that it had been started with a combustible liquid. Suspicions that ini-
tially arose from the rapid growth, intense heat, and unusual burn
patterns of the ﬁre were conﬁrmed, at least in the investigator’s mind,
when he found an empty can of Coleman fuel in the front hall closet of
the Knapp home.
Having concluded the ﬁre was caused by arson, Arizona oﬃcials
turned their suspicions to the only two adults in the house at the time of the
ﬁre—John Knapp and his wife, Linda. Several nights after the ﬁre, under
close and vigorous interrogation at the police station, John Knapp confessed
that he had started the ﬁre deliberately. John recanted the confession
almost immediately, but the confession was enough to convict him of ﬁrst-
degree murder and secure for him the sentence of death—a result
applauded by outraged citizens of Arizona.
When our ﬁrm entered the case seven years later, there was little hope
for John Knapp, and few people who cared to help him. Initially we agreed
to look at the case simply as a favor to an overworked and thoroughly
frustrated criminal defense lawyer who believed John Knapp to be an
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innocent man but who had exhausted all of his time and energy for the
case. Lawyers in our ﬁrm who looked closely into the facts and met John
Knapp soon also concluded that he was an innocent man. Time does not
permit me to recount all of the eﬀorts undertaken during the next eleven
years, but let me mention a few of the high points.
At John Knapp’s murder trial, the defense had argued that the Knapp
girls set the ﬁre themselves. John was unemployed at the time of the ﬁre, the
heat in the house had been turned oﬀ by the electric company, and John
and his wife had resorted to Coleman lanterns and stoves for lighting,
heating, and cooking. The girls had been seen playing with matches more
than once. The defense theorized that the girls awoke on the cold morning
of the ﬁre and started playing with matches in their cluttered bedroom,
inadvertently setting the ﬁre that caused their deaths.
The prosecution debunked this theory, arguing that an accidental ﬁre
would have burned slowly, leaving the girls and their parents ample time to
detect the ﬁre and either extinguish it or escape from the house. Prosecution
experts testiﬁed that the rapid and intense heat of the ﬁre simply was
inconsistent with the progression of a slow-burning accidental ﬁre. It had to
have been aided by some form of combustible liquid such as Coleman fuel.
By the time we became involved in the case seven years later, ﬁre science
had made great strides, particularly with respect to a phenomenon known
as ﬂashover. Flashover occurs when a ﬁre in a conﬁned area causes heated
gases to collect at the ceiling level. The gases quickly become superheated,
reﬂecting intense heat back down on objects in the room. This reﬂected
heat causes the room literally to burst into ﬂames, and the conﬁned space
quickly becomes a raging inferno. Tests at Harvard University had shown
that even a small ﬁre, through ﬂashover, can quickly cause an entire room
to burst into ﬂames. The ﬂashover phenomenon was not generally under-
stood when John Knapp was tried for the murder of his daughters in .
Our ﬁrm ultimately hired several ﬁre experts from around the country
to examine the evidence from the Knapp ﬁre. These experts concluded that
all of the indicators relied on by the Arizona arson expert were consistent
with an accidental ﬂashover ﬁre. Our defense team even built a replica of
the small bedroom, down to the placement of furniture and other objects
in the room, and ignited a small amount of paper to show how quickly a
ﬂashover ﬁre could spread. Within minutes the small room became the
raging inferno that the arson experts had testiﬁed could only have been
caused by a combustible liquid.
In , after six years of attempting to obtain a hearing on post-
conviction relief, we were permitted to place this ﬂashover evidence before
an Arizona superior court judge. After reviewing the evidence, the judge
found that it “would probably change the [guilty] verdict,” and granted
John Knapp a new trial.
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At Knapp’s original trial prosecutors had placed in evidence the Cole-
man fuel can found in the closet of the Knapp’s home after the ﬁre. They
referred to it as “the death can.” The prosecutors told defense counsel and
the court that they had tested the can for ﬁngerprints but that all prints on the
can were smudged. While preparing for the new trial years later, we insisted
upon the disclosure of all information in the state’s ﬁles. To our surprise, we
learned that the ﬁngerprints on the Coleman fuel can were not smudged as
the prosecutors had asserted during the ﬁrst trial. Eleven clearly identiﬁable
prints had been found on the can before the ﬁrst trial, and none of them
belonged to John Knapp. All of them belonged to Linda Knapp—John’s
wife. This evidence suggested that John Knapp had not used the can to start
the ﬁre and then returned it to the hall closet, as the prosecution claimed.
Linda Knapp apparently had been the last person to touch the can, and she
told investigators she had placed the empty can in the closet several days
before the ﬁre occurred.
But we still were faced with the very troubling fact that John Knapp had
confessed to committing the crime. We learned several signiﬁcant facts
about the confession.
On the night of the confession John Knapp was suﬀering from a severe
migraine headache—a recurring condition for which he had been receiving
medical care. The detectives who questioned Knapp later testiﬁed that his
pain was so severe during the interrogation that he literally was pulling hair
from his head. The confession, given in a nine-foot-by-nine-foot room
under close questioning by two investigators, and while John Knapp was
suﬀering a migraine headache, was at least suspect.
John Knapp recanted his confession almost immediately, saying that he
had confessed to protect his wife. Knapp later claimed that he told his wife,
in a phone conversation from jail the day after the confession, that he had
confessed to protect her because the police had told him the ﬁre was set
deliberately and he did not want her to be charged with the crime. At trial
the prosecution rebutted this explanation by noting that Knapp had spoken
with his father-in-law shortly after the confession but had not stated to him
that the confession was false.
Seventeen years later, as we were approaching Knapp’s newly won
retrial, the prosecutors ﬁnally revealed that the telephone conversation
Knapp claimed to have with his wife in  had in fact been tape-recorded
by the State and never disclosed to defense counsel. We obtained a copy of
the tape. As lawyers from our ﬁrm listened to the recording for the ﬁrst
time, they heard the voice of a tearful John Knapp,  years younger, telling
his wife that he did not set the ﬁre that took the lives of his children and that
he had confessed because he feared she would be charged with the crime if he
did not take responsibility for the ﬁre. The tape, of course, strongly cor-
roborated Knapp’s explanation of the confession.
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There is much more I could tell you about this case. John Knapp is now
a free man, living in Pennsylvania and working at a full-time job. In more
than two years of freedom, as in the years before the ﬁre, John Knapp has
had no diﬃculty with the law. After spending  years on death row—at one
point coming within  hours of execution—John Knapp has become a
contributing and responsible member of society.
There is a remarkable corollary to this story. Shortly after John Knapp
was released from prison, our ﬁrm received a letter from a young man
named Ray Girdler, who was serving two consecutive life sentences for the
arson deaths of his wife and child in a mobile home ﬁre near Prescott,
Arizona. Girdler wrote, “I too am innocent,” and asked our ﬁrm to help
him. We chuckled about the new specialty we apparently were developing
and responded with a polite letter declining to become involved.
In short, Ray Girdler persisted, and we eventually agreed to look at his
case. What we found was astonishing. Ray Girdler had been convicted of
the arson deaths of his wife and daughter on the testimony of the same
investigator who testiﬁed at John Knapp’s murder trial. Lawyers from our
ﬁrm quickly determined that the arson conclusions in the Girdler ﬁre
were even more doubtful than those in the Knapp ﬁre. And in the Girdler
case there was no confession, no motive, no Coleman fuel can—only the
testimony of an arson investigator who concluded that the ﬁre had not
been accidental.
After an extended evidentiary hearing, the Yavapai County judge who
had sentenced Ray Girdler to two consecutive life sentences ordered that a
new trial be held. We then convinced the court to hire an outside expert to
examine the evidence of arson. The expert quickly concluded that the
Girdler ﬁre had been entirely accidental. He found the Arizona investigator’s
conclusions of arson to be professionally negligent and morally unforgivable,
and recommended in the strongest terms that the charges against Ray
Girdler be dropped. The prosecutor agreed.
Ray Girdler, like John Knapp, is now a free man. After spending eight
years in prison under consecutive life sentences, Ray now lives in Phoenix
where he is resuming his college studies and recently was promoted to
manager of a retail store.
I suspect you would not be surprised if I told you that our ﬁrm’s
defense of John Knapp and Ray Girdler have been among the most satisfy-
ing aspects of my law practice. And I did not work on either case. They
were handled by other lawyers in our ﬁrm. As a partner in the ﬁrm I
helped to ﬁnance the eﬀort, and even that meager contribution has been
very rewarding.
I am not here tonight to urge you to take up the cause of death-row
inmates. I recount the Knapp and Girdler cases as examples. I have found
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similar satisfaction from other, less dramatic pro bono projects, such as
helping a poor mother of three to fend oﬀ an unscrupulous debt collector,
assisting another woman in retaining her trailer home, and helping the
Arizona state bar in closing down some lawyers who were engaging in
patently misleading advertising. What little pro bono work I have done
has been enormously rewarding—more so than any other aspect of my
litigation practice.
That is why I believe there is a connection between the two develop-
ments I described at the beginning of my remarks. It is not a coincidence
that dissatisfaction with the profession is reaching its peak at a time when
lawyers must, by ethical requirement, be forced to spend even one hour per
week helping those in need. Lawyers who lament to the National Law Journal
that law is becoming more a business than a profession ought to remember
these words of Roscoe Pound:
Historically, there are three ideas involved in a profession, organization,
learning, and a spirit of public service. These are essential. The remaining
idea, that of earning a livelihood, is incidental.3
These words seem out of place, even antiquated, to our modern legal
profession—a profession that focuses more attention on earning money
than on public service. But remember, that is the same modern profession
that lawyers now ﬁnd quite unsatisfying.
You law students might not recognize it, but as a lawyer you will have
marvelous powers. You can open locked doors, break down walls, ﬁnd solu-
tions to impossible problems. The plight of John Knapp and Ray Girdler
illustrate that there are people in our society who ﬁnd themselves helpless
before the law. Without the assistance of a lawyer, these people often are
incapable of helping themselves. In today’s world of legal complexities, even
a simple landlord-tenant problem can become an insurmountable barrier to
one untrained in the law. Honest people of modest means often ﬁnd them-
selves at tremendous disadvantage in their personal, family, and business
dealings when they lack legal counsel. Those of us who have a monopoly on
legal services must provide the assistance if it is to be provided at all.
Thus, whether you’re heading for private practice, government service,
or an in-house position in business, I believe you will ﬁnd your greatest
professional fulﬁllment in doing for others what they cannot do for them-
selves. Charles Dickens once wrote that “any Christian spirit working
kindly in its little sphere . . . will ﬁnd its mortal life too short for its vast
means of usefulness.”4 That truth applies as fully to the practice of law as it
did to Scrooge’s counting house.
It is my hope that you will undertake your life in the law as Woodrow
Wilson counseled, “with a view to the amelioration of every undesirable
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condition that the law can reach, the removal of every obstacle to progress
and fair dealing that the law can remove, the lightening of every burden the
law can lift and the righting of every wrong the law can rectify.”5 If that is
too tall an order, then I challenge you to accept the ABA’s goal of devoting
 hours per year to helping others with your legal skills. Such devotion will
ﬁnd for you much happiness in the law.
This address was given at the BYU Law School awards ceremony on March ,
. Reprinted from the Clark Memorandum, Fall , –.
David G. Campbell received his J.D. from the University of Utah in  and
clerked for Justice William H. Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court –. He
is currently a partner at Osborn Maledon in Phoenix, Arizona.
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